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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
fer was viewed as no more than a transfer or assignment for the benefit of
creditors, with the assignee receiving no greater rights than the transferor
possessed.
MAURICE S. CULP
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Substantive Crimes
1 Burglary
Of the three burglary decisions discussed here, the first deals with the
elements which are necessary to constitute the crime. It held insufficient an
indictment which charged that the defendant did "unlawfully" attempt to
break and enter an uninhabited building in the night season. By statute'
the breaking and entering must be "maliciously and forcibly" done.2 The
second case3 was concerned with the burglary of an uninhabited building.
The defendants were convicted upon the basis of circumstantial evidence.
The court of appeals affirmed the conviction wherein the elements of the
crime were established by a showing that the building was burglariously
entered, that goods were stolen and that the accused were apprehended with
the goods in their possession plus other inculpatory circumstances. The third
case4 concerned a prosecution for the possession of burglar tools. The tools
themselves were of a kind commonly used for lawful purposes. It was held
that in such cases it is incumbent upon the state to prove that the implements
found were in the possession of the accused and that he intended to use them
burglariously in as much as intent is an essential element of the offense.
2. Forgery
The one case dealing with the crime of forgery holds that a criminal act
may flow from the signing of the accused's own name. This decision was
based upon the broad language of the Ohio statute,6 which uses the phrase-
ology "falsely makes, alters, forges, counterfeits, prints or photographs." It
was held that a person is guilty of forgery in the false making of a check
1OHIo REv. CODE S 2907.10 (OHIo GEN. CODE § 12438)
'State v. Cimpritz, 158 Ohio St. 490, 110 N.E.2d 416 (1953)
'State v. Mumpower, 115 N.E.2d 587 (Ohio App. 1952).
4 State v. Cimpritz, 93 Ohio App. 407, 113 N.E.2d 662 (1952) This reversal led
to another trial at which Cimpritz was again convicted. The trial court was reversed.
See note 2 supra.
'State v. Haven, 91 Ohio App. 578, 109 N.E.2d 48 (1951), 5 WrsT. REs. L. REv.
115.
'OHio REV. CODE § 2913.01 (Owo GEN. CODE § 13083)
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drawn upon a bank in which the person has no deposit with the intent that
another give credit to it as genuine and authentic, even though the de-
fendant signs his own name. Also a person who utters such a check with
intent to defraud is guilty of forgery.'
3. Manslaughter
The manslaughter case" involved the unlawful killing of a person while
in the act of violating two criminal statutes. It appeared that the accused
had been tampering with a gas meter in a room where he had equipment
which could be used for making intoxicating liquor. Gas escaped from a
break in the pipe and killed one person and injured others. One defense
was that the "gas tampering" statute, defining a crime against property, was
not the kind of a statute the violation of which will furnish the unlawful act
necessary to make an unintentional homicide, manslaughter. This defense
was rejected, the court pointing out that the offense nevertheless involves the
safety of the public and that its violation may result in personal injury or
death.
4. Perjury
In State v. O'Lewary the court of appeals held that false testimony, wil-
fully and corruptly given by a witness pursuant to an oath administered by
an examiner in the Bureau of Inspection and Supervision of Public Offices,
Department of the Auditor and also before a grand jury came within the
statute on perjury.i'
5. Gambling
Three cases construed three different sections of the Ohio Revised Code
relative to gambling. One common pleas court decision," held that bingo
and keno are lotteries within the meaning of the state statute.1 2 The action
was to restrain the arresting and prosecuting of officers, employees and
members of a charitable organization engaging in the business of conducting
these games.
A court of appeals decision,13 in construing the "common gambler"
See note 4 supra.
'State v. Thrash, 93 Ohio App. 458, 113 N.E.2d 675 (1952)
93 Ohio App. 547, 114 NXE.2d 297 (1952).
"OHIO REv. CODE § 2917.25 (OmIo GEN. CODE § 12842)
"Wishing Well Club, Inc. v. Akron, 112 N.E. 41 (Summit Com. Pl. 1951)
1"OHIo REv. CODE §§ 2915.10 to 2915.13 (Oio GEN. CODE § 13063 to
13064-1).
'State v. Curry, 92 Ohio App. 1, 109 N.E.2d 298 (1952), construing OsIo REv.
CODE 5 2915.14 (Oino GEN. CODE § 13065).
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statute; held that the offense of being a common gambler may consist of
engaging in commercial gambling for a livelihood on a part time basis.
The offenses under the criminal laws need not be confined to specific acts
of commission or omission, and even a part time livelihood obtained from
commercial gambling is a mode of life inimical to the public welfare.
The third decision1' held that a person who merely owned and possessed
gambling devices, though acquiring the devices before the effective date of
the.prohibitory statutes, was properly convicted. The court held the statute
constitutional. 15
In State v. Johnson the trial court's instruction limited the jury in con-
sidering the justification for carrying a concealed weapon to evidence of
the lawfulness of the business at the. tune, and the connection of the carry-
ing of the weapon with such lawful business. The court of appeals held this
erroneous."" Under these statutes' 7 it is held that an accused cannot claim
justification unless he is engaged in a lawful pursuit, but if he falls within
that class he may go further and show circumstances which would justify a
prudent man to carry a weapon for the defense of his person, property or
family.
6. Rape
From the instructions of the trial court the jury might have found cer-
tain acts which did not amount to an assault and yet find the accused
guilty of assault with intent to rape. The supreme court held that there
may be an attempt to rape without an assault with intent to rape, and that
it is erroneous to charge the jury in such a manner that it may find a de-
fendant guilty of an assault with intent to rape if it merely finds the de-
fendant guilty of an attempt to rape.'
7. Contributing to the Delinquency of a Minor
Two court of appeals decisions were concerned with convictions of
adults for the craime of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. In the
first case' 9 the court reversed a conviction and directed the defendant's dis-
charge because of insufficient evidence, but stated that the statute20 is
't Dodson v. Urbana, 49 Ohio Op. 469, 109 N.E.2d 555 (App. 1952), appeal dirlm,
158 Ohio St. 550, 110 N.E.2d 424 (1953).
" OHio REV. CODE 5 2915.17 (OHio GEN. CODE § 13066-2)
" 64 Ohio L. Abs. 425, 112 N.E.2d 62 (App. 1952).
"OIO REv. CODE § 2945.76 (OHio GEN. CODE § 13448-4) and OHio REv. CODE
§ 2923.01 (OHio GEN. CODE § 12819).
' State v. Hetzel, 159 Ohio St. 350, 112 N.E.2d 369 (1953).
" State v. Clark, 92 Ohio App. 382, 110 N.E.2d 433 (1952).
20OHIO REV. CODE § 2151.41 (OHio GEN. CODE 5 1639-45).
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violated whenever -the -acts proved are of -a nature and character that they
constitute within themselves the probability; of.-leading the child into -a
delinquency, irrespective of whether the delinquency actually develops.
The other decision2L sustained a conviciion of af'tadult who was unaware
that the person in question was a minor. The accused was a member of
a gambling conspiracy which was using a minor as a "runner." He was
convicted under the theory that the acts of.one member of a conspiracy
toward.the accomplishment of the unlawfuli purpose are imputable to all
members.
8. -Inferior Degrees
The supreme court22 had occasion to consider again the doctrine of "in-
ferior degrees" or "included offenses'" in an interesting case in which the
accused was indicted for assault with intent to kill and convicted of assault
with intent to maim. It was held that "assault vith intent to maim" '23 was
not a lesser included offense. The test-for the determination of this prob-
lem is whether all the elements of a separate offense are present with others
in an offense charged in an indictment. Thus where all the elements of an
offense are included among the elements of a charged offense, the former is
a lesser included offense. However, to convict for the lesser included of-
fense, there must be evidence tending to support each of the necessary ele-
ments of such offense;
Jurisdiction
A considerable variety of questions involving jurisdictional issues were
decided. "The supreme court;24 apparenily for the first time, decided that a
judgment of conviction based on a fatally defective indictment is void for
' Stateex rel. Sipos v. Davis, 113 N.E.2d 385 (Ohio App. 1953).
=State v. Kuchmak, 159 Ohio St. 363, 112 N.E.2d 371 (1953). This decision af-
firmed in part the judgment of the court ofappeals in State v. Kfichmak, 93 Ohio
App. 289, 113 N.E.2d 643 (1952) and specifically upon the point of the "included
offense" doctrine. The court of appeals had said that the doctrine of lesser offenses
does not have application where the crimes are inherently and essentially so different
in their nature, character and atrocity as to belong to entirely different classes of
crime.
Omio REv. CODE § 2901.19 (OHio GEN. CODE § 12416). The assault with in-
tent to kill statute is OHIO REV. CODE § 2901.24 (OHio GEN. CODE § 12421).
The "lesser offense" statute is OHIO REV. CODE § 2945.74 (Oio GEN. CODE §
13448-2).
' State v. Cimpritz, 158 Ohio St., 490, 110 N.E.2d 416 (1953). It follows natur-
ally that it could be attacked by a collateral proceeding as indicated by the statement
of the supreme court in the siLth -paragraph of the syllabus.
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW[
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and therefore may be success-
fully attacked on direct appeal.
1. Justice of the Peace and Municipal Courts
A number of decisions concerned the jurisdiction of these lower courts.
In State ex reL Della v. Justce of the Peaoe the court of appeals de-
termined that a justice of the peace has county wide jurisdiction in all crimi-
nal matters where there is no other court with county wide jurisdiction other
than the common pleas, police or mayor's courts. It was also determined
that the clause "there is no other court" in the jurisdictional statute refers to
courts other than that of a justice of the peace. In State v. Wheelock2"
it was determined that a municipal court had concurrent jurisdiction within
its county with a justice of the peace of offenses which are within the county
wide jurisdiction of justices of the peace.2 7 A third decision2 held that a
municipal court, being a court of limited jurisdiction, did not have county
wide jurisdiction over violations of the Uniform Traffic Act since there is
no statute conferring such jurisdiction. The latter decision casts doubt upon
the correctness of the holding in the Wheelock case.
2. Habeas Corpus to Test Jurisdiction
The writ of habeas corpus is a favorite device for attacking jurisdiction,
and that procedure was used to raise jurisdictional questitions in a number of
cases. Beard v. State2" raised an interesting question of jurisdiction of a
single judge to accept a plea of guilty and pass sentence under an indictment
returned at a date prior to the effective date of the Ohio statute requiring
the impaneling of a three-judge court to determine such matters. It was
held that the finding and filing of the indictment was a "pending prosecu-
tion" within the meaning of the saving clause of the more recent statute.2 0
In State v. Hollingsworth"' a justice of the peace had committed the
petitioner to jail for 60 days on a charge of assault and battery. After five
days he was conditionally released and thereafter recommitted for breach of
probation. The court of appeals held that the original committment was
sufficient authority for holding petitioner for the balance of the term,
without credit for the time he was out; the assumption of authority to admit
to probation did not invalidate the original commitment.
In another case 2 the jurisdiction of the common pleas court to commit a
person under indictment for crime to the Lima State Hospital for observa-
=64 Ohio L. Abs. 225, 111 N.E.2d 410 (App. 1951).
' 64 Ohio L Abs. 129, 111 N.E.2d 412 (Piqua Mun. Ct. 1951)
' The statute describing the general jurisdiction of the justices of the peace is OHIO
REV. CODE § 1901.20 (OHIO GEN. CODE § 1598)
' State v. McCoy, 94 Ohio App. 165, 114 N.E.2d 624 (1953)
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tion, without notice to such person that his sanity is under investigation and
without affording a right to be heard and to offer evidence, was questioned.
In holding the common pleas court to be without jurisdiction the court of
appeals indicated that as to such proceedings the court is of limited or
special jurisdiction. Furthermore, in the exercise of such special statutory
powers not belonging to the court as such, there is no presumption in favor
of jurisdiction. This is, of course, contrary to the normal view that a judg-
ment in a criminal cause is valid until the contrary appears.33
Intent or Scienter
Two decisions construed statutes which as such did not include scienter
as an element of the offense. In State v. Wiiams"- the statute made it a
penal offense to take, catch or be in possession of undersized fish. Accused, a
truck driver who transported the fish, was charged with a violation. He had
no knowledge that the -shipment contained undersized fish, and it was un-
reasonable to require hin to inspect the shipment. Under these circum-
stances the court determined that the statute required proof of scienter. The
court of appeals attempted to reconcile the leading supreme court decision3r
on the matter of guilty knowledge as follows: "in the case of a statute de-
fining an offense regardless of scienter where the means of knowledge are
available to the accused or the act is such as to impose a duty (in the interest
of the public weal) upon the offender at his peril to ascertain the fact of
violation, knowledge is not an essential element to support conviction
On the other hand, we conclude further that upon a charge of violation of a
statute not in terms including scienter, where the means of knowledge are
not at hand or the circumstances are such that the accused is not bound
at his peril to know the fact and obey the law, knowledge of the fact is
essential to support a conviction."31 Such a position was manifestly adopted
in order to save the constitutionality of the statute.
Another decision 37 reemphasized the fact that criminal intent is not an
64 Ohio L. Abs. 532, 112 N.E.2d 832 (App. 1951).
"OHio REv. CODE 5 2945.06 (Omo GEN. CoDE § 13442-5).
2193 Ohio App. 472, 113 N.E.2d 645 (1952).
"State ex rel. Smilack v. Bushong, 93 Ohio App. 201, 112 N.E.2d 675 (1952).
-Tyack v. Tipton, 65 Ohio L. Abs. 397, 115 N.E.2d 29 (App. 1951).
94 Ohio App. 249, 115 N.E.2M 36 (App. 1952)
"Two of the leading cases which state the necessity for proof of guilty knowledge
are Birney v. State, 8 Ohio 230 (1837), and Kilbourne v. State, 84 Ohio St. 247, 95
N.E. 824 (1911). Two leading cases which held that guilty knowledge was not an
element under the circumstances are: State v. Kelly, 54 Ohio St. 166, 43 N.E. 163
(1896); Kendall v. State, 113 Ohio St. 111, 148 N.E. 367 (1925).
" 94 Ohio App. 249, 255, 115 N.E.2d 36, 40 (1952).
'Dayton v. Brennan, 64 Ohio L. Abs. 525, 112 N.E.2d 837 (Dayton Mun. Ct.
1952).
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element in a criminal prosecution arising under the specific requirements
of the Ohio Motor Vehicle Act.
Sufficiency of Indictment or Information
The- supreme court 8 again held that a charge of murder in the first
degree in the perpetration of robbery may include the lesser offenses of
murder in the second degree and manslaughter. A court of appeals de-
cisions' held that the failure of an indictment to particularize the word
"necessities" under a charge of obtaining necessities by false pretenses
did not invalidate it but would make it subject to motion to make definite
and certain. The right to make the motion was waived by the accused upon
the entering of a plea of guilty. Another court of appeals decision reaf-
firmed its former position that an affidavit charging an adult with con-
tributing to the delinquency of a minor which does not set forth facts show-
ing the minor to be a delinquent and facts showing that the accused has in
any way contributed to the delinquency of such minor, does not charge an
offense under the law."0
Evidence of Experiments Out of Court
One court of appeals4 considered the admissibility of expert testimony
of experiments made to demonstrate that the defendant's claim was physi-
cally impossible. The court stated that the conditions need not be identical
with those existing at the time of the occurrence in question; it is sufficient
if there is substantial similarity, but the probative value of the experiments
will depend upon the correspondence of the conditions. If there is an
exact correspondence, the experiment will amount to a demonstration and
be conclusive upon the issue, but dissimilarity of conditions and experiments
goes to the weight of the evidence and even to its admissibility.
Misconduct of the Prosecutor
Two decisions involved the consequences of misconduct of the prose-
cutor in his remarks to the jury. The supreme court held that statements
in the nature of an appeal to the pecuniary interest of the jury were highly
improper and that the refusal of the trial court to sustain objections thereto
constituted prejudicial error.42
A court of appeals decision 3 presented two other facets of this problem.
This case involved a number of improper remarks, some of which were ob-
'State v. Muskus, 158 Ohio St. 276, 109 N.E.2d 15 (1952).
"State ex rel. Leichner v. Alvis, 65 Ohio L. Abs. 420, 114 N.E.2d 861 (App. 1952).
' State v. Kiessling, 93 Ohio App. 524, 114 N.E.2d 154 (1952).
" State v. Farrell, 64 Ohio L Abs. 481, 112 N.E.2d 408 (App. 1952).
[Spring
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jected to and others not formally-noticed by defense counsel. As to those
objected to, it was held that an immediate instruction to the jury cured any
possible prejudice; the other remarks not noticed, since they were not so
flagrantly improper as to prevent a fair trial, could not be the basis of error
because no timely objection was made.
Sentence
The defendant was convicted, among other things, of failing to support
his four children under an indictment containing a count as to each child.
In passing sentence the trial court considered that a separate offense had
been committed as to each child. This decision was affirmed, and the
authority of the trial court to impose sentences which in some cases ran
consecutively was upheld."
Speedy Trial
Defendant, charged with first degree murder, alleged to have occurred
14 years before, was apprehended after the April grand jury had completed
its work. He made a motion to cause a grand jury to be called to
consider his special case. The motion was overruled,4 5 and the trial court
in its opinion stated that the guarantee of a speedy trial in the Ohio Con-
stitution does not entitle the accused to an immediate trial; the speedy trial
to which an accused is entitled is one conducted according to fixed rules,
regulation and proceedings of law, free from vexations, capricious and op-
pressive delay created by the prosecutor. It does not shield an accused
against the consequences of any delay made necessary by the law itself.
Bail
In construing the provisions of the statute 4 authorizing any party re-
quired to give a recognizance to deposit cash or bonds in an amount equal
to the bond in lieu of a real property bond, one court4 7 decided that there is
no recognizance when the deposit is made; no notice is required and the
deposit is ready to be seized for nonappearance at the day set for trial.
There is no need for any notice as required by Ohio Revised Code Section
2937.38 (Ohio General Code Section 13435-18) where a person is under
recognizance with a surety and fails to appear and answer.
' State v. Muskus, 158 Ohio St 276, 109 N.E.2d 15 (1952).
' State v. Landrum, 113 N.E.2d 705 (Ohio App. 1953).
" State v. Sharier, 93 Ohio App. 191, 112 N.E.2d 551 (1952).
"State v. Mango, 114 N.E.2d 499 (Trumbull Com. P. 1953).
"Omo REv. CODE § 2937.28 (OHno GEN. CODE § 13435-8).
'7 State v. Wilson, 65 Ohio L Abs. 422, 115 N.E.2d 193 (Piqua Mun. Ct. 1950).
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Probation and Parole
Three court of appeals cases considered the necessity for and the type of
hearing a probationer is entitled to have prior to the revocation of his proba-
tion. In Cleveland v. Hutcherson48 it was held that the trial courts must first
have made a judicial inquiry to determine whether or not the defendant had
broken the terms of his probation before vacating the order of probation and
ordering the original sentence into execution. The right to suspend
sentence and place a defendant on probation is controlled entirely by
statutes in Ohio. After the exercise of the power of suspending sentence and
ordering the defendant on probation, any attempt to vacate the order and
enforce the original sentence must be done after making a "judicial inquiry"
and a finding that the order be set aside.49 Normally a judgment revoking
probation can be set aside only by an appeal on question of law, but where
the court ignores the code and engages in no judicial inquiry whatever, the
defendant is deprived of his liberty without due process of law, and a writ
of habeas corpus may be granted to restore hum to such lawful custody as
existed prior to unwarranted order revoking the probation.50 The nature
of the "judicial inquiry" will depend upon the individual circumstances.
When the defendant is brought before the judge and admits the charges of
violation and counsel make their statements, the procedure meets the re-
quirements of the statute.5'
Upon the revocation of probation and the reffiposition of sentence, the
defendant cannot object that his probationary period exceeded the duration
of his maximum sentence. Under the code -52 the period of probation is
discretionary with the court so long as the total period does not exceed five
years. The court does not lose jurisdiction because the probationary period
was longer than the maximum sentence authorized for the crime.53
Criminal Appeals
Several miscellaneous appellate problems were also considered during
the year. It was held that the general statute54 relative to bills of exceptions
did not repeal the former statutes"5 relative to bills of exceptions in criminal
cases from justice of peace courts.5 6 In passing on a motion seeking an
" 114 N.E.2d 611 (Ohio App. 1953).
" See OHIO REV. CODE 5 2951.09 (OHIO GEN. CODE § 13452-7)
' State ex rel. Baker v. Tehan, 94 Ohio App. 290, 115 N.E.2d 19 (1953)
" State ex rel. Crocket v. Alvis, 109 N.E.2d 27 (Ohio App. 1951).
52 OHIO REV. CODE § 2951.07 (OHIO GEN. CODE § 13452-5)
See note 51 supra.
OHIO REv. CODE § 2945.65 (OHIO GEN. CODE § 13445-1)
"OHIO REV. CODE §§ 1913.31, .32, .33, .34 (OHIO GEN. CODE 5§ 10359, 10360,
10361, 10362)
" State v. Steele, 92 Ohio App. 128, 109 N.E.2d 579 (1952)
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